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November 11, 2011 AZ CORP COMMISSION DOCKET CONTROL

File No. 509.01

TRANSMITTED VIA FIRST CLASS MAIL

Arizona Corporations Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Attn: Docket Control

Re:

In re the Matter of Mark W. Bosworth, et al.

Docket No. S-20600A-08-0340

Arizona Corporation Commission DOCKETED

NOV 1 5 2011

DOCKETED BY WS 88

Dear Sir and/or Madam:

Enclosed herewith are the original and 14 copies of our Reply to Response to Motion to Dismiss, etc. in the above-referenced matter. Please file the same and conform and return one copy to us in the stamped envelope provided.

Sincerely,

THE ADAMS LAW FIRM, PLLC

By

Al Cedro

Paralegal to Jeffrey R. Adams, Esq.

AMC/hs Enclosure(s)

	Jeffrey R. Adams, #018959		
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	Attorneys for Respondents Bosworth	DOCKET CONTROL	
6	BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION		
7			
8	In the Matter of:		
		Docket No. S-20600-A-08-0340	
9	MARK W. BOSWORTH and LISA A.		
10	BOSWORTH, husband and wife;	REPLY TO RESPONSE TO	
11	STEVEN G. VAN CAMPEN and DIANE	MOTION TO DISMISS RE: FAILURE TO PLEAD WITH	
11	V. VAN CAMPEN, husband and wife;	PARTICULARITY AND FAILURE	
12		TO PROPERLY ALLEGE BASIS	
13	MICHAEL J. SARGENT and PEGGY L.	FOR PIERCING CORPORATE	
Į.	SARGENT, husband and wife;	VEIL	
14	ROBERT BORNHOLDT and JANE DOE	(Oral Argument Requested)	
15	BORNHOLDT, husband and wife;		
16		(Assigned to the Hon. Mark E. Stern)	
10	MARK BOSWORTH & ASSOCIATES,		
17	LLC, and Arizona limited liability company;		
18	company,		
	3 GRINGOS MEXICAN INVESTMENTS,		
19	LLC, an Arizona limited liability company;		
20	Respondents.	,	
21	Respondents.		
22			
23	Respondents Mark and Lisa Bosworth, husband and wife (collectively herein, "Bosworths"		
24	or "Respondents"), through their undersigned counsel, hereby file their Reply to the State's		
25	Response to their Motion to Dismiss premised upon the State's failure to plead its claims with		

particularity and failure to plead a basis for imposing personal liability upon the Bosworths. As set

forth in detail below in the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the State has failed to demonstrate, legally, support for its contention that it is exempt from the particularity requirements of Rule 9, Ariz. R. Civ. P. Further, the State likewise fails to establish a legal basis upon which it is exempt from setting forth a legal basis upon which to pierce the corporate veils of the corporate Respondents. Accordingly, the Bosworths' Motion should be granted.

Respectfully submitted this // day of Novable, 2011.

THE ADAMS LAW FIRM, PLLC

Bv

Jeffrey R. Adams, Esq

Attorney for Respondents Bosworth

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. Rule 9, Ariz. R. Civ. P., Governs The State's Notice And Because the State's Notice Does Not Comply With That Rule, The Case Against The Bosworths Must Be Dismissed.

In its Response, the State does not argue that its Notice does not satisfy the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P. Rather, the State simply asserts that it is not required to comply with that Rule. However, the State's argument is incorrect.

In the Response the State asserts that Division notices are subject to a "notice pleading rule" which the State asserts is set forth at Arizona Administrative Code Rule R14-4-306. *See* Response at 3:1-3. However, the State's assertion is wrong. A review of Rule R14-4-306 reveals that it neither specifically nor generally addresses precisely what is or is not required in a Division notice.

In further support of its argument, the State asserts that its conclusion that Division notices are subject merely to a "notice pleading rule" is "consistent with [A.R.S.] § 41-1061(B)(4) of the [Arizona Administrative Procedures Act] which states that the notice given requires '[a] short and plain statement of the matters asserted." *See* Response at 3:3-6 (emphasis added). However, the State is in error again.

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1061(A), a party to an adjudicative proceeding is entitled to "reasonable notice." Further, while A.R.S. § 41-1061(B)(4) states that a notice need contain "[a] short and plain statement of the matters asserted," the Statute goes on to require that a short and plain statement is sufficient only if "the agency or other party is unable to state the matters in detail at the time the notice is served" and requires thereafter a party is entitled to "a more definite and detailed statement." A plain reading of the foregoing not only implies but states specifically that parties to administrative proceedings are entitled to particularity as opposed to generalities. In other words, a Division notice must be something much more than a notice pleading.

The other two Rules relied upon by the State are R14-3-101(B) and 106(E), pursuant to which the State asserts that the liberal construction and speedy determination standards applicable to the Rules and proceedings, respectively, imply that a Division notice need not include particularity. However, neither of those Rules provide guidance of any kind regarding what is required in a Division Notice.

As acknowledged by the State, the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure must be followed in administrative proceedings when the Administrative Rules or regulations do not specifically address procedural and substantive issues. *See* Response at 13-15; *see also* R14-3-101(1). This premises is echoed by the Arizona Appellate Courts. *See e.g., Western Water Works v. Industrial Com'n of Ariz.*, 213 Ariz. 521, 144 P.3d 535 (Ct.App. 2006) ("[A]lthough the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure do not govern workers' compensation proceedings ..., they provide guidance and support our analysis.) (emphasis added). Importantly, the fact that the Commission should follow the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 9(b), is supported by the law that provides that the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure apply in administrative appeals filed pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-901 *et seq.* Logic dictates that in the absence of specific rules otherwise, if appeals of administrative

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decisions require compliance with the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, administrative proceedings themselves should follow those same rules in the absence of specific rules.

Interestingly, the most significant argument advanced by the State in opposition to the Bosworths' Motion is that providing particularity in the Notice would have been difficult because the State's case allegedly involves dozens of investors who allegedly purchased millions of dollars worth of securities. See Response at 3:17-21. However, that is a faulty argument. Respondents herein have not argued that the State was required to articulate every instance of misconduct. Rather, the Bosworths argue that at a minimum, the particularity requirements had to be met by providing at least some level of particularity that would serve to identify specific conduct by the Bosworths for which they are accountable separate and distinct from the conduct of other Respondents. However, the State provided not even a semblance of particularity in the Notice. Even the "examples" offered up by the State in its Response provide nothing of substance and are, rather, merely conclusory statements at best, which is improper. Further, the State completely ignores the law prohibiting the lumping together of groups of defendants. Accordingly, because the Administrative Rules are silent on the issue of what is required in the Notice, inasmuch as no legal authority exempts the State from compliance with the particularity requirements set forth in Rule 9(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P., and due the State's tacit admission that the Notice does not comply with the particularity requirements set forth in Rule 9(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P., this matter should be dismissed as to the Bosworths.

II. Rule 9(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P., Applies To The State's Claims Premised Upon A.R.S. § 44-1991.

Without citing to any authority, the State argues that Rule 9(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P., does not apply to Notices alleging violations of A.R.S. § 44-1991. In making this argument, the State asserts that the elements of such a claim are set forth in the Statute itself. However, that statement is incorrect.

Alleging a violation of the foregoing statute is not accomplished by alleging generically that one has violated the statute. The fact is, A.R.S. § 44-1991 does not, as is the case with respect to R14-3-306, articulate precisely what must be contained within a Division notice alleging a violation of the statute. Accordingly, absent statutory guidance and instruction, we default to the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure and specifically Rule 9(b) because A.R.S. § 44-1991 pertains to fraud in connection with the sale of securities. And because the State does not deny that its notice fails to comply with that Rule, it is deficient and the claims against the Bosworths must be dismissed.

Further, factual details are necessary to decipher which of the collective group of Respondents is liable for which conduct. That is precisely the rationale for the law prohibiting the lumping together of groups of people or entities in alleging fraud related types of claims. And because the State failed to distinguish the conduct of the Bosworths from that of the other Respondents, it has failed to meet its notice obligations. Accordingly, this matter should be dismissed as to the Bosworths.

With respect to the balance of the State's arguments in its Response, it is clear that it believes that the State is grasping at straws to justify its failure to comply with its particularity obligations. The State has not complied with the well-established law governing the piercing the corporate veil. There is no Rule or regulation that establishes or states that Divisions notices are subject to simple notice pleading standards. Accordingly, in the absence of such a mandate, Division notices must meet with the particularity requirements set forth in Rule 9(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P., in the event the Division's claims against a respondent sound in fraud. Because the State failed in the foregoing regards, its claims against the Bosworths must be dismissed.

III. Conclusion.

Based on the foregoing, this matter as it pertains to Respondents Bosworth should be dismissed with prejudice.

1	Respectfully submitted this 1 day of No von	2011.
2	7	THE ADAMS LAW FIRM, PLLC
3	I	By
4		Jeffrey R. Adams, Esq. Attorney for Respondents Bosworth
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6		
7 8	Original of the foregoing sent via First Class Mail and electronic this // day of // over 1, 2011 to:	
9	Docket Control	
10	Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington	
11	Phoenix, Arizona 85007	
12	Copy of the foregoing sent via	
13	First Class Mail and electronic mail this Ihr.day of Holoube, 2011 to:	
14	Mark E. Stern	
15	Administrative Law Judge	
16	Hearing Division Arizona Corporation Commission	
17	1200 West Washington	
18	Phoenix, Arizona 85007	
19	Wendy L. Coy, Esq. Arizona Corporation Commission	
20	Securities Division	
21	1300 West Washington 3 rd Floor	
	Phoenix, Arizona 85007-2929	
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27	Attorneys for Respondents Sargent	

Matthew Neubert, Director **Securities Division** Arizona Corporation Commission 1300 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Robert D. Marshall, Esq. Joshua R. Forest, Esq. Julie M. Beauregard, Esq. Mitchell & Forest, P.C. 1850 North Central Avenue, Suite 1715 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Attorneys for Respondents Van Campen $\mathbf{B}\mathbf{y}$